Balkot to Bahawalpur: How India redefined vengeance with Operation Sindoor
India’s Operation Sindoor began at midnight of 7 May, marching its most vocal military reaction to cross -border terrorism. Pahalgam was triggered by the massacre – where tourists were targeted in a brutal execution -launch murder – the Indian Army carried out deep coordinated attacks inside Pakistan, hitting high -value terrorist infrastructure.The response was Swift, multi-domain and accurate. India used stand-off weapons, including aerial-launched cruise missiles, littering mons and long-range drones, including Muridke and Bahawalpur, including Muridke and Bahawalpur, including Muridke and Bahawalpur, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jai-e-Mohammed symbolic and operating hubs, to hit nine places in Pakistan.why it mattersContrary to earlier military reactions such as the 2016 URI surgical strikes or 2019 Balakot Airtrike, Operation was not about Sindor symbolism or preventive threats. It was about direct, physical costs – to reduce terrorist abilities and force Pakistan’s military -native Nexus to reconsider their operating latitudes.India did not just retaliate – it proceeded and won in the round.
What are they saying
- “There is no place in Pakistan where terrorists can sit and breathe peacefully. We will enter their homes and kill them,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on 13 May on the basis of an Indian Air Force.
- “India’s response will be even stronger,” Modi told US vice -president JD Vance when Pakistan was informed with the intention of retaliation.
Big picture
- Likes like goals: India went after the heart of Pakistan’s terrorist ecosystem. MuridK and Bahawalpur are not just military goals – they are ideological nerve centers. India also hit Pakistan -occupied Kashmir and at least one known operating base in Hezbul Mujahideen.
- Strategic surprise: Despite being anticipated, India pulled the strike with accuracy. Internal sources told TOI that the government took a “Bol Ki Mara, Joe said Soiya” moment – a promise was made, which was fully given.
- Combinations in action: The operation included the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force working in coordination – India has long aspired for a level in India.
Principle of Modi government: cost of violenceIndia’s strategic thinking has moved for risk from restraint (2001–2016), and now for regular, calibrated vengeance. PM Modi clearly implicated it: Pakistan’s nuclear preventive no longer connects India’s hands. His May 12 speech called Sindoor a “new benchmark” and declared a “new normal” – a where India would default for military reactions against terrorism.Modi said, “We will not go through nuclear threats … We consider terrorists and their military supporters one and the same.”This was more than political rhetoric. As the inner sources of India’s defense establishment told the Times of India, “We were not about consultation whether we should strike.” They were about where and when. ,In an article of war in war, analyst Arjan Tarapur writes: “New Delhi now concludes that such an opponent is the best approach.zoom in:Operation Sindoor not just demolished the infrastructure – it pierced a long -term impurities by Pakistan -based terrorist groups. By launching accurate, visible attacks on its most symbolic sanctuaries, India has forced Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others to renovate a psychological renovation. The message was clear: No place is beyond India’s reach. As the war on The Rocks notes, these groups will now have to look at their backs continuously, sink the energy, focus and resources that were once uniquely targeted in India.Terrorist leaders now work under the constant fear of targeted Indian attacks, forcing them to adopt the first mentality of survival that reduces their ability to plan massive attacks.Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have to be manpower and funded to reconstruct the facilities that destroy, which limits their aggressive postures and forces them to adopt more cladstine mode of operation.Traditional safe havens – once untouchable hubs in places like Muridke and Bahawalpur – are now exposed, even making regular activities such as training, recruitment and logistics a possible liability.
Operation Sindor has now shut down a cat and mouse game, where terrorists were earlier enjoying safe shelter in Pakistan, hiding in peacock and taking more and more measures to go to the ground in crisis.
Arjan Tarapore’s article Operation Sindor on the war on the Rocks
Leadership decapitation, such as near Masood Azhar and the death of many family members, shows fear and mistrust within command structures, especially around the credibility of his Pakistani military protector.Like Israel’s enemies after repeated attacks, Pakistan -backed terrorists will spend rapid theft and hiding circles – not aggression – potentially reducing the frequency and scale of Indian soil attacks.
After this, to direct military action, Pakistan -based terrorists have to dedicate a part of their work to protective preparation, possibly to take away resources from the plan operations in India.
Arjan Tarapore’s article Operation Sindor on the war on the Rocks
Israel parallelIn its logic, India’s new strategy reflects closely to Israeli’s “grass of grass” – periodic military functions do not mean eliminating enemies or ending conflict, but rather degradation of capacity and buying relative calm parts. Israel accepted long ago that there was no possibility of peace with groups like Hizbullah or Hamas. Instead, its strategy has focused on trimming its power at regular intervals.India, similarly, admits that terrorism from Pakistan is not a policy aberration, but a permanent feature. Now goal is management, not resolution.Tarapur clearly stated it: “If India can effectively degrade the enemy – which means that the terrorist network and their army – then future attacks may be at least destructive and less frequent. This strategic concept depends faster on India and heavy for every attack.”What will happen next
- Operation Sindor was effective -but future phases can be difficult.
- Terrorists now know that they are insecure. They will adapt, hide and reorganize. India’s intelligence and strike capabilities should be further developed.
- Public expectations: Modi’s muscle outlook has increased nationalist enthusiasm. Managing domestic expectations in future crises will be as important as managing management.
- Policy Business: Military force is not enough alone. India will need to avail global coordination against diplomacy, economic equipment (such as Indus Waters Treaty), and terrorist financing. Otherwise, the military strategy risk itself becomes an end – not a step towards the resolution.
(With input from agencies)
